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The Consolidation of the Secondary Financial 
Services Market
DAVID STOESZ
University of Illinois–Springfield 
Department of Social Work
Stagnant income and persistent debt have induced low- and 
middle-income households to rely on alternative financial ser-
vices (AFS): buy-here-pay-here auto loans, check-cashers, payday 
loans, auto title loans, rent-to-own furniture and appliances, and 
pawnshops. A secondary financial services market has evolved to 
serve the secondary labor market, replete with trade associations 
as well as state and federal regulators. Mainstream financial in-
stitutions have marketed innovations, such as reloadable debit 
cards, to appeal to low- and middle-income consumers. High fees 
and interest rates of AFS products have fueled a volatile debate 
about the future of the secondary financial services market, 
with options including prohibition, regulation, and inclusion.
Key words: debt, alternative financial services, AFS, secondary 
financial services, secondary labor market
A tidal wave of debt has swept over the lower economic 
elevations of America, not only obliterating the prosperity of 
poor households that had struggled with declining incomes 
for decades, but more recently destabilizing a large swath of 
middle-income families that relied on credit to bolster family 
finances (Edsall, 2012). The Great Recession, a dramatic re-
versal of the fortunes of low- and middle-income families, 
caused working class families to resort to Alternative Financial 
Services (AFS) to maximize their increasingly tenuous resourc-
es; however, as the tsunami reached higher elevations, middle-
income households turned to AFS, as well. When banks and 
credit unions failed to respond to the needs of increasingly 
desperate working families, struggling households resorted to 
a burgeoning network of buy-here-pay-here auto sales, payday 
and auto title lenders, check-cashers, rent-to-own vendors, and 
pawnshops. 
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Theory
That such vendors would evolve during a prolonged eco-
nomic crisis is consistent with Robert Merton’s (1957) observa-
tion that those of lower status create institutional arrangements 
when mainstream opportunity structures are not available. 
Practically speaking, AFS evolved to serve financially bereft 
households. In theoretical terms, a secondary financial services 
market, providing quick cash at relatively high fees and inter-
est, had evolved parallel to a secondary labor market, consist-
ing of low-wage, intermittent jobs without benefits or career 
trajectories. 
The theoretical basis of AFS is largely derived from neo-
classical economics, which presumes that people use infor-
mation at hand in order to make rational choices about their 
well-being. Various factors interfere with this formulation, 
explaining the advent of AFS: people lack adequate informa-
tion about products and make suboptimal decisions; vendors 
are not equally distributed geographically and they customize 
products to meet consumer preferences; and, consumers are 
creatures of habit, frequenting vendors when better choices 
are readily available (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Within a larger 
social context, these imperfections contribute to economic 
inequality, which is exacerbated by institutional dynamics: 
public schools fail to educate, employers discriminate against 
job applicants, and social programs provide inadequate ben-
efits and services (Stiglitz, 2012). The interaction of these dy-
namics leaves certain rural and urban areas in chronic poverty 
(Jargowsky, 1997), and residents frequently resort to AFS.
Initially justified in order to reverse the ravages of the 
Great Depression, government has been actively involved 
in public policy, in the process affecting economic inequality 
(Noah, 2012). Since the 1980s, policies preferred by conserva-
tive Republicans have subverted the prosperity of low- and 
middle-income Americans, battening those with high incomes 
(Johnson & Kwak, 2012). Thus, dualism, a persistent feature 
of democratic-capitalist political economies, has become more 
pronounced. While the primary labor market has benefited 
from job security and financial products, the secondary labor 
market has experienced significant erosion in its economic 
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circumstances. This is evident not only with respect to income, 
but assets as well (Lerman & McKernan, 2008). Without ad-
equate income to sustain an already precarious level of con-
sumption, many working class families sought credit wherever 
it was available, finding AFS vendors receptive to their needs. 
The cost of AFS products was high, but the plight of many low-
income people was urgent, and they had few options. 
As the secondary financial services market expanded and 
diversified, it became embedded in lower-income urban and 
rural communities. Eventually, AFS vendors became a fixture 
in the lives of the working poor. At the same time, the high 
fees and interest rates of some products (such as payday loans, 
which carry an APR of 391 percent for $15 charged per $100 
over two weeks) have provoked a volatile debate about reform 
of AFS. Innovation in the secondary financial services market 
evolved as technological developments, such as payroll direct 
deposit and reloadable debit cards, are marketed to consumers 
who find them more attractive than traditional financial prod-
ucts of mainstream financial institutions.
A burgeoning secondary financial services market would 
mature with the establishment of trade associations represent-
ing the interests of vendors. At the same time, fierce opposi-
tion would arise from nonprofit organizations that vehement-
ly objected to the high APR of AFS products. The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), established in 2010, was 
designed to rein-in financial abuses from Wall Street to Main 
Street; however, its rocky start reflected the turbulence of the 
financial services markets. Ultimately, the future of the sec-
ondary financial services market will be determined by three 
quite disparate strategies of reform: prohibition, regulation, or 
inclusion.
Background
The working poor have long relied on financial services 
that have been separate from mainstream banking. As such, 
various financial products have evolved which have prompt-
ed state and federal regulation; regardless, low-income, mi-
nority families have found mainstream financial institutions 
chronically problematic with respect to their financial needs. 
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For example, the proliferation of salary lenders after the 
Civil War served as an impetus for state usury prohibitions, 
contributing to Progressive Era reforms and, ultimately, the 
regulatory regime of the New Deal (Longman & Boshara, 
2009). Denied access to mainstream financial institutions, im-
migrants and freed slaves established their own savings insti-
tutions. Early in the 20th century, the credit abuse of poor im-
migrants prompted the Russell Sage Foundation to subsidize 
philanthropic pawnshops (known as remedial loan societies) 
in several large cities, of which only the Provident Loan Society 
still exists in New York City at five locations (Caskey, 1994).
In 1933 the Glass-Steagall Act authorized the newly es-
tablished Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
to regulate savings institutions and limit interest rates for 
savings accounts as well. Decades later, the 1977 Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) prohibited “red-lining,” the prac-
tice of denying mortgages and other loans to entire neighbor-
hoods of consumers suspected of being high risk, and required 
banks to make credit available to poor families. Just as the CRA 
prompted banks to serve low-income, disproportionately mi-
nority families, stagflation of the mid-1970s pushed interest 
rates above traditional usury limits, prompting states to relax 
regulation of financial institutions. Soon, bi-partisan support 
grew for deregulating financial services altogether, liberal 
Democrats advocating for innovative financial products to 
bring the marginalized poor into the economic mainstream, 
and conservative Republicans seizing the opportunity to shed 
the burdensome regulations that had interfered with self-
correcting financial markets. The resultant 1980 Depository 
Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act removed 
interest rate caps on loans, providing a fertile ground for ex-
pansion of vendors outside the financial mainstream (Bostic & 
Lee, 2009). 
As nonmainstream financial providers expanded after the 
1980s, introducing new product lines, their lexicon evolved 
accordingly. Initial reactions were negative, as the invocation 
of “predatory lender” by Bruce Marks when he challenged 
Boston’s Fleet Bank for appending high fees and interest rates 
on loans to duped consumers in the early 1990s, attests (Rivlin, 
2010). An early study described the activities of check-cashers 
and pawn lenders as “fringe banking,” a British term coined 
by economist Hyman Minsky (Caskey, 1994). Eventually, 
scholars proposed the term “alternative financial services” to 
differentiate pawnshops, payday lenders, check cashers, and 
rent-to-own stores from traditional financial institutions. A 
journalistic exposé freighted the fringe economy with terms 
such as “shadow banks,” “financial shakedowns,” and “shark 
bait” (Hudson, 1996), while an academic critique that included 
payday lenders, buy-here-pay-here auto sales, and subprime 
mortgages referred to lenders as the “fringe economy or pred-
atory lending” (Karger, 2005). In 2009, the FDIC published its 
first assessments of Alternative Financial Services (AFS), and 
the term has since become widely accepted.
Declining Fortunes
What had been a relatively small fringe economy expand-
ed exponentially during the final decades of the 20th century. 
A primary factor was the decline in discretionary income of 
working class families. “The average two-income family earns 
far more today than did the single breadwinner of a generation 
ago,” observed then-Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren and 
her financial consultant daughter. “And yet, once they have 
paid the mortgage, the car payments, the taxes, the health in-
surance, and the day-care bills, today’s dual-income families 
have less discretionary income—and less money to put away 
for a rainy day—than the single-income family of a generation 
ago” (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 3).
The expansion of AFS paralleled the steady erosion of the 
income of the working poor. Between 1979 and 2011, the growth 
in household income of the bottom quintile of families was neg-
ative 0.4 percent and zero for the next lowest quintile. Falling 
family income followed the decline of good jobs—those paying 
the median wage of $18.50 in 1979 (in 2011 dollars) coupled 
with employer-provided health insurance and a company 
pension—from 37.4 percent in 1979 to 27.7 percent in 2011, a 
drop of 25.9 percent. Meanwhile, from 1979 to 2011 wages fell 
4.3 percent for the lowest decile of workers and increased only 
1.3 percent for the second decile. The proportion of workers 
earning poverty-level wages remained virtually unchanged 
despite the economic expansion of the 1990s, 29.9 percent in 
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1973 dropping to 28.0 percent in 2011. The underemployment 
rate, historically higher for African Americans and Hispanics, 
compared to Whites, doubled from 2008 to 2010, reaching 25 
percent. By 2010, the number of unemployed, those working 
part-time but wanting full-time work, and workers margin-
ally attached to the labor force exceeded 25 million (Economic 
Policy Institute, 2012). Not only did the lowest forty percent 
of families absorb significant income losses during the Great 
Recession, but they also continued to lose income after the re-
covery began.
Under optimal circumstances, households can rely on 
assets to buffer income shocks; however, few low-income 
families have sufficient reserves to sustain themselves for 
three months at the federal poverty level. Before the Great 
Recession, such “asset poverty” was extensive: between 1996 
and 2001, the average family in the lowest quartile of house-
holds claimed assets valued at $0 and for the bottom half only 
$31. Fully 84.5 percent of families in the bottom third of the 
income distribution claimed such small reserves as to be asset 
poor (McKernan, Ratcliffe & Vinopal, 2009). During the 2000s, 
many low-income families went into debt, some spectacularly 
so. In 2001, the mean net worth of households at or below the 
25th percentile was $100, but by 2010, it was negative $12,800. 
During this period, the mean net worth of households between 
the 25th and 49.9th percentile dropped from $54,400 to $35,600 
(Federal Reserve, 2012). Predictably, the financial prospects of 
lower income families worsened during the Great Recession. 
In 2009, the average wealth of the lowest quintile of families 
was negative $27,000, while that of the second lowest quintile 
was only $5,000. Between 1983 and 2010 the net worth of the 
lowest 40 percent of households declined 1.95 percent, leaving 
them with few resources to address routine bills, let alone 
expense shocks (Economic Policy Institute, 2012).
The Great Recession effectively erased the asset gains of 
minority households. Between 2005 and 2009, median wealth 
of White households fell 16 percent, but 53 percent for African-
American families and 66 percent for Hispanics. Minority fam-
ilies not only lost financial ground, but many found themselves 
in debt: almost one-third of Black households (35 percent) and 
Hispanic households (31 percent) had zero or negative net 
worth in 2009, compared with 15 percent of White households, 
a significant increase since 2005, when 29 percent of Blacks, 
23 percent of Hispanics, and 11 percent of White households 
reported zero or negative wealth. Put another way, in 2009 24 
percent of African-American households and 24 percent of 
Hispanic households had no assets other than a vehicle (Taylor, 
Kochar, Fry, Valasco, & Motel, 2011, pp. 1, 23).
Table 1. Share of Debtors with Any Payment 60 Days or More Past 
Due, Percentile
Family Income 2001 2010
     Less than 20 13.4 21.2
     20 to 39.9 11.7 15.2
     40 to 59.9 7.9 10.2
     60 to 79.9 4.0 8.8
     80 to 89.9 2.6 5.4
     90 to 100 1.3 2.1
Family Net Worth
     Less than 25 17.8 22.2
     25 to 49.9 7.1 13.3
     50 to 74.9 3.6 6.8
     75 to 89.9 .7 2.0
     90 to 100 .3 1.2
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances, 2012.
From 2001 to 2010, faltering income and eroding assets in 
relation to household expenses left consumers in debt, strug-
gling to pay bills on time. While more than one in ten low-in-
come and low-wealth households had missed a debt payment 
beyond two months in 2001, the percent had increased signifi-
cantly by 2010. More and more families were falling further 
behind in debt (Federal Reserve, 2012).
The Great Recession also retarded upward mobility among 
minority families, which had lagged previously. A pre-reces-
sion report on mobility sponsored by prominent policy insti-
tutes across the ideological spectrum concluded,
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It is fairly hard for children born in the bottom fifth to 
escape from the bottom: 42 percent remain there and 
another 42 percent end up in either the low-middle or 
middle fifth. Only 17 percent of those born to parents in 
the bottom quintile climb to one of the top two income 
groups. (Isaacs, 2006a, p. 5) 
Many minority children actually experienced downward 
mobility. Of Black children with middle class parents, 45 
percent fell to the bottom of the income distribution, compared 
to 16 percent of White children. Poor Black children fared the 
worst: 54 percent of children in families in the bottom quin-
tile remained there, compared to 31 percent of White children 
(Isaacs, 2006b). The recession further slowed the upward mo-
bility of minorities. A post-recession analysis of economic mo-
bility concluded that one-fourth of middle class children had 
fallen out of the middle class as adults, a prospect that affected 
38 percent of African-American men (Acs, 2011).
Banking Defections
While the economic travails of the working poor became 
more acute, mainstream financial institutions were less acces-
sible to them. Between 1975 and 1995 the number of banks and 
savings institutions serving communities with upper incomes 
increased from 9,251 to 15,646, while those serving neigh-
borhoods with lower incomes decreased from 2,164 to 1,719 
(Avery, Bostic, Calem, & Canner, 1997). Karger (2005) observed:
The consolidation in the banking industry over the 
past 20 years has reduced the number of banks in 
low-income neighborhoods, increased the focus of 
banks on corporate and high-income customers, and 
limited banks’ interest in serving consumers with small 
accounts or less-than-perfect credit. (p. 12).
Bank deregulation, in other words, left large numbers of 
poor Americans without convenient banking institutions for 
essential financial services, a vacuum that AFS would quickly 
fill. “Check-cashing stores and pawnshops and payday lending 
stores, those are the poor man’s institutions,” proclaimed 
former pro-football player and ad man for Advance America, 
Willie Green:
You go to any poor Black person, and I guarantee you, 
they’ve borrowed money from a payday person, a 
title loan person, or a pawnshop. That’s what you do 
if you don’t have the luxury of going into a bank and 
borrowing money. (quoted in Rivlin, 2010, p. 256)
As banks and savings associations retreated from low-in-
come areas, a significant number of consumers became “un-
banked” because they did not have an account with a bank 
or credit union or “underbanked” because they had such an 
account, but used AFS as well. In part, not having a formal rela-
tionship with mainstream financial institutions was due to bad 
experiences. During a five-year period, 73 percent of payday 
consumers had loan applications refused or limited by main-
stream financial organizations. Subsequently, 67.7 percent did 
not apply for loans from banks or credit unions because they 
expected the application to be rejected (Elliehausen, 2006). By 
the late 2000s, the number of unbanked consumers lacking a 
savings or checking account totaled 7.7 million households 
or 9 million Americans; underbanked consumers who had a 
savings or checking account but relied on AFS represented 
17.9 percent of households, or 21 million Americans. Access 
to financial services fell disproportionately on racial and mi-
nority groups. While 21.7 percent of African Americans and 
19.3 percent of Latinos were unbanked, those underbanked 
were 31.6 percent and 24.0 percent respectively, rates signifi-
cantly higher than the general population. The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) concluded, “overall, almost 54 
percent of black households, 44.5 percent of American Indian/
Alaskan households, and 43.3 percent of Hispanic households 
are either unbanked or underbanked” (2009, pp. 3-4). Even 
if they held accounts with mainstream financial institutions, 
many lower income families relied on AFS as well, especially 
minority households. 
The defection of consumers from mainstream finan-
cial institutions is evident in data collected by the Survey of 
Consumer Finances. In 1989, 18.7 percent of respondents had a 
checking account. By 2010, the percentage had dropped to 9.6 
percent. Over a decade, consumers voiced different reasons for 
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not having checking accounts, as seen in the following tables. 
Conspicuous changes include the percent of consumers who 
do not write enough checks to make a checking account worth-
while and the increase in those who do not like banks, over 
one-fourth of respondents (Federal Reserve, 2012). 
Table 2. Reasons for Not Having a Checking Account, Percent
Reason 2001 2010
Do not write enough checks to make it 
worthwhile 28.5 20.3
Minimum balance too high 6.5 7.4
Do not like dealing with banks 22.6 27.8
Service charges too high 10.2 10.6
Cannot manage or balance a checking account 6.6 4.7
Do not have enough money 14.0 10.3
Credit problems 3.6 4.2
Do not need/want an account 5.1 7.3
Other 2.8 7.4
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances, 2012. 
Table 3. Select Populations by Banking Status
Population % Unbanked % Underbanked % Fully Banked
All Households 8.2 20.1 68.8
Blacks 21.4 33.9 41.6
Hispanics 20.1 28.6 48.7
Foreign-born 
noncitizens 22.2 28.9 45.8
Unemployed 22.5 28.0 47.5
Income below $15,000 28.2 21.6 47.6
Unmarried 19.1 29.5 48.8
Under age 24 17.4 31.0 49.7
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2012.
By 2012, many consumers had begun to use AFS. While 
a majority of the population had a financial relationship with 
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a bank or credit union, many demographic groups either 
engaged with AFS or lacked any relationship with mainstream 
financial institutions.
The Rise of Alternative Financial Services
Declining fortunes with respect to income and assets 
eroded the already fragile finances of working poor families. A 
survey of the unemployed showed that many resorted to bor-
rowing to meet routine expenses but all too often found that 
inadequate; as a result debt accumulated. Researchers from 
Rutgers University found that 56 percent of the unemployed 
borrowed money from family and friends to cover expenses 
in 2010; 45 percent increased credit card debt, but 25 percent 
missed credit card payments. While 24 percent missed a mort-
gage or rent payment, 8 percent declared bankruptcy (Borie-
Holtz, Van Horn, & Zukin, 2010, p. 12).
Mounting stress on family finances increased the demand 
for credit in low- and moderate-income households. As their 
economic prospects dwindled and households struggled 
to pay routine bills and faced unexpected expense shocks, a 
growing number of families needed quick access to short-term 
credit to keep their foundering economic boats afloat. In 2010, 
the FINRA Investor Education Foundation published the first 
of three studies of financial capability which included several 
AFS products: auto title loans, payday loans, an advance on 
a tax refund, pawn, and rent-to-own. “Non-bank methods of 
borrowing” were higher among the minority poor who were 
younger and less-educated. While Blacks and Latinos were 
equally likely to take out an auto title loan, African Americans 
were more likely to frequent a pawnshop while Latinos were 
more likely to resort to payday lending. Almost one-fourth of 
respondents, 23 percent, had used one of these AFS products 
within the past five years, and utilization was higher for the 
unbanked, 44 percent, than those who had bank accounts, 20 
percent (FINRA Foundation, 2010, pp. 6-7). 
Similarly, a survey of Latino households in Los Angeles 
conducted by the Pew Health Group revealed that many 
households resorted to AFS: 37 percent of those with a bank 
account and 74 percent of the unbanked. Families found AFS 
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providers accessible geographically and during evening and 
weekend hours. Many found AFS a convenient way to pay 
monthly bills. Researchers concluded that Hispanic house-
holds represented a sizeable financial market that was served 
by AFS providers (Tellalian, Tseng, & Eleni, 2010).
In 2010, the Center for Financial Services Innovation (CSFI) 
surveyed 170 providers of financial products (32 percent non-
profits, 17 percent banks, 12 percent credit unions, 11 percent 
vendors, 8 percent prepaid card vendors, and 7 percent check 
cashers/payday lenders) and reported that 87 percent of those 
serving the underbanked expected services to expand, includ-
ing 94 percent of commercial providers. The portrait that 
emerged from the CFSI survey was one in which varied organi-
zations—for-profit and nonprofit, mainstream and AFS—met 
a growing need for immediate, short-term loans. “Although 
the danger of using credit products to excess is undeniable, 
consumers need access to appropriate forms and amounts of 
credit in order to smooth income and pay for emergencies,” 
observed CFSI analysts. “In fact, well-structured credit is es-
sential to support a household’s ability to save and build a 
robust credit history, and to facilitate crucial investments that 
can provide a foundation for other wealth-building activities” 
(Center for Financial Services Innovation, 2011). 
A subsequent CFSI analysis of small-dollar credit borrow-
ers suggested four primary reasons for resorting to AFS: (1) 
confrontation with expense shocks, leaving 47 percent of bor-
rowers to take out one or two loans per year; (2) erratic cash 
flow, accounting for borrowing smaller amounts, with 42 
percent taking out six or more loans annually, while 16 percent 
take out more than 12 loans annually; (3) insufficient income, 
prompting borrowers to take out loans to meet routine expens-
es, accounting for smaller loans, with 77 percent of loans less 
than $500; and (4) planned purchases for a car or appliance, 
accounting for one or two loans per year, but at amounts that 
exceeded $1,000 (Bianchi & Levy, 2013). CFSI research of bor-
rowers' perceptions are supported by researchers from the Pew 
Charitable Trusts, who reported that 56 percent of consumers 
found payday loans a source of relief, as opposed to 31 percent 
who said payday loans were a source of anxiety. Yet, urgency 
plays a role in borrowing: 37 percent of respondents stated 
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they would have sought a payday loan under any conditions 
offered (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013, pp. 21, 41). As consum-
er demand for credit expanded, working families resorted to 
various strategies to address static income and deteriorating 
assets, sometimes under acute financial distress.
By the end of the 2000s, AFS represented a significant 
market in financial services, generating over $319 billion annu-
ally by providing financial services to those who are excluded 
from, or elected to avoid, mainstream financial services. 
Table 4. Primary Sectors of the Secondary Financial Services Market
Sector Volume ($Billions) Percent
Buy-Here-Pay-Here Auto Loans  80    24.9
Check Cashing 58 18.1
Payday Loans 48 15.0
Overseas Wire Remittances 46 14.3
Open-Loop Prepaid Cards 39 12.1
Refund Anticipation Loans 26 8.1
Money Orders 17 5.3
Rent-to-Own Transactions   7 2.2
Source: (Bradley, Burhouse, Gratton & Miller, 2009, p. 39)
Such growth was evidence that AFS was responding to 
consumer demand by hiring courteous staff that arranged 
quick transactions through hours extended into the evenings 
and weekends (Servon, 2013). The proliferation of payday 
lending, by way of illustration, has been attributed to its 
appeal to consumers who have had negative experiences 
with banks. Scanning the interior of a payday loan store, a 
journalist observed, “It’s like banking turned upside down. 
Poor customers are commodities, deposits are irrelevant, bad 
credit makes for a good loan candidate and recessions can be 
boom times” (McGray, 2008). In a presentation to the FDIC, 
the Financial Service Centers of America (FiSCA) described 
how its members responded to customers by including access 
to services at times and locations that are convenient to them, 
and that suit non-traditional work schedules that leave little 
free time. 
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They need the services to be provided in languages 
they can understand—frequently more than just 
English and Spanish—by staff that makes them feel 
comfortable and that reflects the culture, customs and 
colors of the neighborhood. They need products and 
services tailored to their unique needs, preferences 
and economic circumstances, rather than being served 
“stripped-down” versions of what is designed for more 
affluent consumers. (FiSCA, 2007, p. 2)
In this regard, FiSCA reported in 2006 that 75 percent of 
consumers rated the value of its financial products as “ex-
cellent” or “very good,” virtually the same level of customer 
satisfaction in 2000. Similarly, 78 percent of consumers rated 
service quality as “excellent” or “very good,” a slight decrease 
from 81 percent in 2000 (Cirillo, 2006). Studies such as this are 
conducted on a sample of customers who use financial servic-
es at stores that subscribe to FiSCA’s “codes of conduct” that 
prescribe best practices for member vendors (FiSCA, 2013), a 
condition of membership, so consumer perceptions may be 
different at non-FiSCA member stores. 
The establishment of trade associations reflected the 
maturation of AFS. The Financial Service Centers of America 
(FiSCA) was established in 1987 and represents vendors of 
several products: check cashing, money transfers, bill paying, 
money orders, and payday loans. Initially representing check-
cashers, FiSCA has expanded to other lines of financial ser-
vices and now represents 7,000 providers serving 30 million 
consumers annually. Joseph Doyle, FiSCA’s Chairman, noted 
the reason why the organization has grown: 
Our customers appreciate the convenient access and 
high quality services we offer. We fit into their busy 
lives, with most FiSCA member stores open six or 
seven days a week. Almost all of our members are open 
hours later than banks and credit unions; some even 
stay open 24 hours a day. Consumers are very willing 
to pay reasonable fees for this type of convenience and 
recognize that we offer good value. In many cases it is 
less expensive to use one of our outlets than to use a 
bank. In fact, 60 percent of FiSCA member customers 
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have a traditional savings or checking account at a bank 
or credit union, yet choose to conduct their financial 
transactions at our member locations (Doyle, 2013, p. 
1). 
In 1999 the Community Financial Services Association 
of America (CFSA) was established as a membership orga-
nization of payday lenders. In April 2001, CFSA collaborat-
ed with the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown 
University in a survey of payday customers, which revealed 
that most were workers supporting young families and who 
possessed a checking account (Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001). 
Subsequently, one of the researchers of this study moved to 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and au-
thored a January 2009 report on payday lending, which showed 
that most borrowers used loans for emergencies and were 
quite satisfied with the product (Elliehausen, 2009). CFSA pro-
moted “best practices” among members, including the offer to 
customers of an “extended payment plan” through which bor-
rowers are offered more time to pay off a loan (CFSA, 2009).
Conclusion
This installment, the first of a two-part series, chronicles 
the evolution of AFS in response to the deteriorating financial 
circumstances of working poor households. Already tenuous, 
as measured by income and assets, the prosperity of low-in-
come families plummeted during the Great Recession, with 
the impact especially damaging for minority households. In 
order to sustain an increasingly precarious standard of living, 
families resorted to AFS. In response to rising consumer 
demand, AFS vendors formed trade associations to defend the 
industry, market their financial products, and develop model 
business practices. The second installment proposes AFS as re-
flective of a secondary financial services market that comple-
ments the secondary labor market, explores the controversy 
around “predatory lending” as well as regulatory strategies, 
and details the rapid innovation of financial products designed 
for the working poor. Community-based financial services are 
proposed as a strategy to provide constructive financial prod-
ucts to low-income families.
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